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John R.  Walter 
“Landmark Lifts Re.wve,  Takes $28  MiDion  LIXS” 
“‘PNC  to Boost  Loss Reserves By As Much As $450  Milclion” 
“‘Big  l’oan-kx.s  prw&‘ons,  refzecting  gIoomy economic  prospects, continued to color the earnings 
reports of regional banks .  .  . ” 
“UJB Raises Loan Reserves and Posts  $17  Milrlion  Los” 
“<Bank  of Boston  reported Thursday that it lost $187  million in the  @wth  quatier, after taking a 
$280  milion provision fir  c&it  Losses.  Th  company al’s0 announced plans  to cut  .  .  . 
IOOOjobs  .  .  . ” 
(American Banker various  199 1 issues) 
In  1990  banks  throughout  the  United  States  had 
total  provision  for  loan  losses  of over  $3 1 billion,  an 
amount  almost  twice  bank  profits.  Since  the  mid- 
198Os, provision  for  loan  losses  has  been  one  of the 
most.  important  factors  affecting  bank  profitability. 
Headlines  and  narratives  like  those  listed  above 
demonstrate  the  interest  of  the  financial  press  in 
banks’ loss provisions.  Yet for many  banking  students 
the  subject  generates  questions:  What  types  of  ac- 
counts  are  being  discussed?  Is  there  a  difference 
between  loan,  loss  reserves,  loan  loss  provision, 
provision  for  credit  losses,  and  allowance  for  loan 
losses?  Where  do  these  reserves  come  from?  How 
do  banks  decide  how  much  to  add  to  the  reserve? 
Why  does  increasing  reserves  produce  losses  for 
banks?  And  why  do  banks  use  reserves  in  the  first 
place?’ 
This  paper  seeks  to  answer  these  questions.  In 
doing  so it lists and defines  the  terminology  frequently 
used  in discussions  of bank  loan  losses  (see  “Defini- 
tions  of Terms”  on  p.  29)  and  examines  the  history 
and  current  use  of the  reserve  for  loan  losses.  It also 
discusses  how  and  why  methods  for  determining  the 
level  of  reserve  for  loan  losses  have  changed. 
1 For  expositional  sim  licity 
l! 
leasing  is  ignored  since  it  is 
handled  in  essentially  t  e  same  manner  as  lending.  Names  of 
accounts  are  therefore  shortened  throughout  the  article.  For 
example,  provision  for loan  and  lease  losses  as on  bank  Reports 
of  Condition  and  Income  is  called  provision  for  loan  losses. 
DESCRIPTIONOFRESERVESFOR 
LOAN  LOSSES 
The  primary  business  of banking  is the  collection 
and  investment  of depositors’  funds.  As a part  of this 
business  banks  bear  credit  risk,  i.e.,  the  possibility 
that  the  borrower  will fail to  repay  as promised.  The 
two  major  assets  in which  banks  invest  depositors’ 
funds  are  securities  and  loans.  Credit  losses  on 
securities  are  minimal  because  the  bulk  of  these 
holdings  are  government  securities  with  little  or  no 
default  risk.  Loans  are  a  different  story.  In  1990 
banks  throughout  the  United  States  wrote  off  over 
$29  billion  in  loans  as  uncollectible  (net  of 
recoveries),  an  amount  almost  twice  total  profits  of 
all  U.S.  banks  for  the  year. 
The  federal  banking  regulators  (Federal  Deposit 
Insurance  Corporation,  Office  of the  Comptroller  of 
the  Currency,  and  Federal  Reserve)  require  that  all 
banks.include  in their  financial  statements  an account 
named  allowance  for loan ioaes (also known  as mserwes 
for  l’oan Loses).  Figure  1  provides  an  illustrative 
example  showing  how  the  reserve  for  loan  losses 
(line  4)  is typically  reported.  The  account  absorbs 
loan  losses  both  from  loans  the  bank  can  currently 
identify  as bad  loans  and  from  some  apparently  good 
loans  that  will  later  prove  to  be  uncollectible.  The 
reserve  for loan  loss  account  is established  and  main- 
tained  by  periodic  charges  against  earnings.  The 
charges  show  up  on  the  income  statement  as  an 
expense  category  named  prw&ion for loan losses  (see 
Figure  2,  line  10).  The  reserve  for  loan  losses  is 
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At  many  banks,  for  analytical  purposes  or 
on  internal  books,  the  reserve  is divided  into 
two  categories,  specific  or  allocated  reserves, 
and  general  reserves.  Specific  reserves  are 
those  that  a  bank  views  as  being  associated 
with  some  particular  loan  or  group  of  loans. 
When  a bank  determines  that  a loan  presents 
a greater-than-normal  risk  of loss it may  either 
add  to  its reserves  specifically  for  that  loan  or 
designate  some  portion  of reserves  to  be  allo- 
cated  for the  loan.  Those  reserves  that  are not 
allocated  to particular  loans  or groups  of loans 
are the  general  reserves.  Division  of the  reserve 
account  into  these  two  categories  allows  the 
bank  to  analyze  its  loan  loss  reserve  needs 
more  precisely.  On  financial  reports,  however, 
general  and  specific  reserves  are summed  and 
reported  simply  as  reserves  for  loan  losses. 
increased  by  an  amount  equivalent  to  the  amount 
charged  against  earnings  as a provision  for loan losses 
(Figure  3,  line  4).  Banks  make  additions  to  the 
reserve  account  when  (1) it has become  apparent  that 
a loan  or group  of loans  is more  likely  to  be  in part 
or wholly  uncollectible;  (2) an unanticipated  charge- 
off has occurred  for which  the  bank  did not  set  aside 
reserves;  or  (3)  the  amount  of  loans  in  the  bank’s 




8  Total  assets 
When  lqan  losses  are  recognized,  that  is,  when  a 
bank  decides  that  some  portion  of a loan  will not  be 
collected  and  therefore  must  be chargedofor  wriz.ten 
down, the  amount  of the  loss  is deducted  from  the 
asset  category  loans  and  also  from  reserves  for loan 
losses.  Suppose  for example  a bank  had  made  a $100 
loan but  only  expected  to be able to collect  $40  from 
the  borrower.  In  Figure  1, $60  would  be  deducted 
from  $64,000  on line 3 so as to reduce  the  loan port- 
folio by  the  uncollectible  amount  of the  questionable 
loan.  The  $60  would  also be  deducted  from  $1,000 
on  line  4.  If the  bank  had  already  anticipated  a $60 
loss  on  the  loan  and  had  added  $60  to  its  reserve 
then  the  bank’s current  income  would  not  be affected 
by the  write-down.  On  the  other  hand  if the  loan loss 
had  not  been  anticipated  before  the  loan  was 
written  down,  then  in all likelihood  the  bank  would 
add  $60  to  its  reserves  following  the  write-down  in 
order  to  maintain  its  reserve  at  a level  sufficient  to 
absorb  future  loan  losses. 
Why  Banks Create  Loan  Loss  Reserves 
Displaying  loans  on  a  bank’s  balance  sheet  as 
the  amount  of funds  lent  without  an adjustment  for 
expected  but  uncertain  future  losses  would  mislead 
the  bank’s  board  of  directors,  creditors,  regulators, 
and  investors  by  overstating  the  bank’s  assets.  The 
income-earning  potential  of the  bank  and  its  capital 
would  also  be  overstated,  making  the  bank  appear 
stronger  than  it  really  is.  One  would  prefer  the 
balance  sheet  to  show  as assets  only  that  portion  of 
loans  that  will be  collected.  It  is difficult,  however, 
for a bank’s management  to determine  before  the fact 
which  loans  will  not  be  repaid.  The  compromise 
Assets 
Figure  1 
Balance  Sheet  as of December  31,  1990 
Illustrative  National  Bank 
(000) 
Liabilities  and  Equity 
Cash  $  8,000  9  Deposits  $  74,000 
Securities 
Total  loans  $ 
Less:  Reserves 
for  loan  losses  - 
Equals:  Net  loans 
Other  real  estate  owned 
Other  assets 
20,000  10  Other  liabilities  19,000 
64,000  11  Total  liabilities  $  93,000 
1,000 
63,000 
400  12  Owners’  Equity  7,000 
8,600 
13  Total  liabilities 
$  100,000  and  owners’  equity  !$ 100,000 
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Income  Statement  for Year  Ending 
December  31,  1990 
Illustrative  National  Bank 
(000) 
Calculation  of  Reserves for  Loan  Losses for  1990 
Illustrative  National  Bank 
(000) 
Interest  income 
1  Interest  and  fees  on  loans 
2  Interest  on  securities 
3  Other  interest  income 
Noninterest  income 
4  Service  charges 
5  Other  noninterest  income 
6  Total  income 
Interest  expense 
7  Interest  on  deposits 
8  Other  interest  expense 
Noninterest  expense 
9  Salaries  and  benefits 
10  Provision  for  loan  losses 
11  Other  noninterest  expense 
12  Total  expense 
13  Income  before  taxes 
14  Income  taxes 
15  Net  income 











$  9,000 
$  1,000 
250 
$  750 
used  by  banks  is to  estimate  the  amount  of  losses 
that  are  likely  to  result  from  all of  the  loans  in the 
bank’s  portfolio  and  to  call this estimate  the  reserve 
or  allowance  for  loan  losses.  According  to  the 
American  Institute  of Certified  Public  Accountants 
(AICPA): 
“  . . . the  allowance  for  loan  losses  represents  an  amount 
that,  in management’s  judgment,  approximates  the  current 
amount  of  loans  that  will  not  be  collected”  [AICPA, 
(1983),  p.  621. 
The  reserve  for  loan  loss  account  appears  on  the 
asset  side  of  a bank’s  balance  sheet  as a deduction 
from  total  loans;  it  is what  accountants  refer  to  as 
a contra  asset  account.  The  total  book  value  of a bank’s 
loans  less  the  reserve  for  loan  losses  should  be,  if 
the  bank  is accurate  in its assessment  of future  loan 
losses,  the  best  estimate  of the  net  realizable  value 
of  the  loan  portfolio  as  of  the  financial  statement 
date.  Total  loans  less  the  reserve  is called  net loans 
(Figure  1,  line  5). 
1  Reserves  for  loan  losses,  beginning  of  1990  $  900 
2  Less:  Charge-offs  during  1990  285 
3  Plus:  Recoveries  during  1990  of  loans 
previously  charged  off  85 
4  Plus:  Provision  for  loan  losses,  1990  300 
5  Reserves  for  loan  losses,  end  of  1990  $  1,000 
Informational Value  of the Reserve 
for Loan  Losses 
Depositors,  bank  stock  investors,  and  bank 
analysts are not,  in general,  privy to information  about 
the  riskiness  of  banks’  loans  beyond  that  revealed 
by the amount  of past due and nonaccrual  loans which 
banks  are  required  to  report.  In  other  words,  the 
management  of a bank  has  more  information  about 
the  quality  of the  loan  portfolio  than  do  outsiders. 
Data  on  the  amount  of  reserves  a bank  holds  and 
additions  made  to  reserves  are  useful  to  outsiders, 
since  they  provide  additional  information  about  the 
quality  or  riskiness  of the  loan  portfolio.  The  value 
of  this  information  is  demonstrated  by  the  strong 
reaction  of  bank  stock  prices  to  unexpected  news 
about  bank  reserves. 
The  loan  quality  information  or  signal  provided 
by  the  reserve  should  be most  trustworthy  immedi- 
ately  after regulators  examine  a bank.  Examiners  pro- 
vide  an  independent,  unbiased  assessment  of  the 
quality  of  a bank’s  loan  portfolio  and  also  have  the 
power  to force  the  bank  to restate  loans  and reserves 
when  their  values  deviate  from  the  regulator’s  best 
estimates.  Financial  reports  coming  out  soon  after 
a visit  from  examiners  are,  therefore,  more  likely  to 
include  an  accurate  statement  of  expected  net 
realizable  loan  values. 
LOAN  CATEGORIES 
At  any  given  time  a bank  is likely  to  have  some 
loans  in  each  of  the  following  four  categories: 
1.  Good  loans.  The  borrower  is  making 
scheduled  interest  and principal  payments  and 
the  bank  has  no  reason  to  suspect  that  the 
borrower  will  not  pay  back  the  loan  in  full. 
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3. 
4. 
Loans  past due or  otherwise in doubt. 
Scheduled  interest  or principal  payments  have 
been  missed  or  the  bank  has  some  other 
information  indicating  that  repayment  of the 
loan  is  in  doubt. 
Written-down  loans.  The  bank  has  re- 
moved  some  of  the  face  value  of  the  loan 
from  its  books  because  it  believes  it  will  be 
able  to  collect  only  a portion  of  the  loan. 
Charged-off loans.  The  value  of the  loan 
has been  completely  removed  from  the  bank’s 
books,  because  the  bank  believes  it  will  be 
able  to  collect  little  or  nothing  from  the 
borrower.  The  bank  may  continue  to attempt 
to  collect  funds  from  the  borrower  though  it 
has  charged  the  loan  off  its  books  and  may 
be  carrying  some  collateral  from  the  loan 
on  its  books. 
Most  loans stay in category  1 until repaid.  Some  loans 
however  start off in category  1 but later travel through 
all three  remaining  categories  before  being  closed  out. 
Any  loan in categories  2 or 4 is a problem  loan.  Loans 
in  category  3  are  often  considered  problem  loans. 
In  some  cases,  however,  when  a  loan  has  been 
written  down  by  an  amount  sufficient  to  lower  its 
reported  value  to  its collectible  amount,  it might  be 
considered  a good  loan. 
The  Problem  Loan 
For  most  loans  only  the  passage  of  time  and 
scheduled  interest  and principal  payment  dates  allow 
banks  to distinguish  good  loans  from  problem  loans. 
When  the  borrower  is more  than  30  days  past  due 
on  a scheduled  payment  the  loan  is considered  past 
due  and  the  bank  lists  it  as  such  in  its  financial 
statements.  The  bank  probably  will have  made  some 
effort  to  contact  the  borrower  to  secure  payment 
before  delinquency  reaches  this  stage.  As  sched- 
uled  payments  fall further  in  arrear,  the  likelihood 
of  ultimate  repayment  diminishes. 
When  repayment  of  a  loan  becomes  less  likely 
most  banks  will add  to the  reserve  in anticipation  of 
a  possible  loss.  Beyond  setting  aside  additional 
reserves,  past  due  or doubtful  loans  may  be handled 
in  one  of  several  ways  depending  on  the  bank’s 
policies.  Some  banks  promptly  charge  past  due  or 
doubtful  loans  off their  books  and  then  attempt  to 
recover  from  the  borrower  whatever  funds  possible. 
Other  banks  carry  such  loans  on  their  books  until 
the  borrower  recovers  or  until  forced  either  by  the 
passage  of  time  or  by  regulators  to  charge  off  the 
loan.  Banks  will at times  attempt  to  renegotiate  the 
terms  of  a  loan  if  renegotiation  seems  likely  to 
encourage  some  repayment.  In most  cases  if a loan 
is  past  due  more  than  180  days  it  will  be  charged 
off or at least  written  down.  When  a loan  is charged 
off, interest  income  accrued  but  not  received  during 
the  current  accounting  period  is subtracted  from  cur- 
rent  income,  and  interest  accrued  but  not  received 
in prior  accounting  periods  is deducted  from  reserves 
for loan  losses  [Board  of Governors  (1984),  Section 
219.1,  p.  41. 
The  decision  between  charging  off  all  or  only  a 
portion  of a loan  will  depend  on  whether  the  bank 
believes  any  of the  loan  is collectible,  on  the  bank’s 
normal  procedures  for  handling  losses,  and  on 
examiners’  opinions.  Banks  with  very  conservative 
loan  loss  procedures  may  choose  to  completely 
charge  off  any  past  due  or  doubtful  loan  even  if it 
is likely to be partially repaid.  Other  banks  may,  when 
relatively  certain  that  some  portion  of  a  loan  will 
ultimately  be collected,  deduct  only  a portion  of the 
face  value  of the  loan  from  the  asset  category  loans, 
meaning  the  loan  is written  down  to  its  collectible 
amount.  The  amount  of  the  write-down  is  also 
deducted  from  reserves  for  loan  losses.  If  it  is 
unlikely  that  any  portion  of a loan  will be ultimately 
collectible  then  the  loan  normally  will be charged  off 
completely.  Regulatory  examiners  may,  following  an 
examination,  require  a bank  to  set  aside  additional 
reserves  for  a loan,  to  write  it down,  or  completely 
charge  it off, depending  on their  opinions  of the  pro- 
bability  of  repayment. 
Collection  of funds  on  a loan  that  has  been  com- 
pletely  or  partially  charged  off  can  be  a  long  and 
expensive  process.  Banks  usually  foreclose  on  or 
repossess  available collateral.  The  amount  a bank  will 
ultimately  recover  from  written-down  or charged-off 
loans depends  on the financial health  of the borrower, 
the  borrower’s  willingness  to  pay,  the  value  of  any 
collateral,  the  strength  of guarantors  or cosigners,  and 
the  ability  of the  bank’s  workout  department  or that 
of the  individual  loan officer  assigned  to the  account. 
Any  recovery  of  an  amount  previously  charged  off 
or  charged  down  is added  to  reserves  upon  its  col- 
lection  (see  Figure  3,  line  3). 
DETERMINATIONOFTHE  SIZE  OFTHE 
RESERVE FORLOANLOSSES 
Banks’  use  of  the  reserve  for  loan  losses,  and 
especially  banks’  decisions  with  respect  to  the  size 
of the  account,  have  changed  since  the  1940s.  The 
main forces  shaping  the  change  have  been  tax policy, 
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of  the  1980s.  For  the  first  30  years  of  the  routine 
use  of the  account,  tax policy  determined  the  amount 
of reserve  held  by banks.  Then  regulatory  pressures 
and high loan losses  became  dominant  determinants. 
The  Influences of Tax  Policy 
From  1947  until  the  mid-1970s  or  early  198Os, 
the  amount  of reserve  for loan  losses  held  by  banks 
was  largely  based  on tax  considerations.  Few  banks 
employed  the  account  before  1947.  Most  banks 
relied  instead  on  the  “specific  charge-off  method” 
since  its  tax  treatment  was  straightforward  [FDIC 
(1947),  pp.  25-26,  and  Blake  (1952),  pp.  30-351. 
That  method  of accounting  for loan  losses  involved 
the  subtraction  of loan  losses  from  current  income 
or  net  worth  when  the  loan  was  charged  off. 
On  December  8,  1947,  the  Commissioner  of 
Internal  Revenue  liberalized  its  policy  for  banks  by 
ruling  that  banks’  reserves  for  loan  losses  could  be 
calculated  in a manner  that  differed  from  that  of other 
businesses  [FDIC  (1948),  p. 451. Banks  were  allowed 
to hold  a reserve  for loan  losses  equal  to three  times 
their  average  yearly  loan  loss  experience  of the  past 
20 years.  Soon  after the  1947 ruling most  large banks 
and many  small banks  began  holding  reserves  for loan 
losses  (see  Table  1). With  some  modifications,  this 
policy  continued  until  1969.  Banks  could  hold 
reserves  exceeding  the  maximum  specified  by  the 
IRS,  but  once  the  maximum  was exceeded  additions 
to the  reserve  were  not  tax deductible.  This  was the 
case  for  years  before  and  since  1969.  See  Table  2 
for  details  of  tax  laws  and  rulings. 
The  Tax  Reform  Act  of 1969  broke  with  the  most 
recent  20 years  of IRS  policy  and gradually  required 
banks  to  hold  a reserve  equal  to  their  current  and 
past  five  years’  losses  [U.S.  Congress,  House  of 
Table  1 
Percentage  of  Banks  with  a  Reserve Account 
in  Selected  Years 
1948  38 
1950  43 
1957  51 
1963  61 
1971  91 
1975  94 
Sources:  1948  and  1950  figures,  FDIC (1950),  p.  51;  1957  figure, 
ARCB (1972),  p.  11;  1963-75  figures,  ARCB (1977).  p.  4. 
Representatives  (1969),  pp.  464-751.  The  1969  act 
was passed  in part  to lower  banks’ tax advantage  over 
other  businesses.  The  change  was  to  be  phased  in 
over  the  next  18  years  (see  Table  2,  1969  Tax 
Reform  Act).  During  the  phase-in  period  a  bank 
could  either  add  to reserves  for loan  losses  until  they 
equaled  a percentage  of loans  specified  by  the  act, 
or until  they  equaled  the  bank’s  average  ratio  of loan 
losses  to  loans  of the  past  six years.  The  maximum 
ratio  of reserves  for loan  losses  to loans  specified  by 
the  act  declined  every  six  years  over  the  18-year 
phase-in. 
In  1986  the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986  was  passed, 
eliminating,  for  banks  with  more  than  $500  million 
in  assets,  the  opportunity  to  subtract,  as  a pre-tax 
expense,  any provision  for future  loan  losses  beyond 
the  amount  of loans  actually  charged  off during  the 
year.  Small  banks  continued  to  hold  reserves  based 
on the  specifications  of the  Tax  Reform  Act of  1969 
[U.S.  Congress,  Joint  Committee  on  Taxation 
(1987),  pp.  549-531. 
The  rapid  growth  in  reserves  following  1947 
and  the  maintenance  of  levels  close  to  the  maxi- 
mum  allowed  by  the  IRS  until  the  early  1980s  are 
apparent  in the  chart  (see  listing  of IRS  maximums 
in Table  2).  While  bank  loan  losses  were  small  and 
on  average  fairly constant  relative  to total  loans  from 
1947  through  the  early  197Os,  banks  held  reserves 
throughout  the  period  that  greatly  exceeded  losses. 
Banks’  best  estimates  of  expected  loan  losses 
during  most  of  the  period  were  almost  certainly 
considerably  lower  than  the  amount  of reserves  held. 
However,  it  was  to  the  banks’  advantage  to  hold 
reserves  at the  maximum  allowed  by  the  IRS  since 
doing  so  resulted  in  lower  taxes. 
Tax  Considerations  Become  Less  Important 
Until  at  least  the  early  to  mid-1970s,  tax  rulings 
and  laws  encouraged  banks  to  hold  reserves  that 
greatly  exceeded  losses  so that  significant  regulatory 
efforts  aimed  at  influencing  banks’  holdings  of 
reserves  were  not  necessary.  Beginning  in  1976, 
however,  federal  regulators  began  to encourage  banks 
to  hold  a reserve  of at least  1 percent  of total  loans. 
By  1976  the  maximum  reserve  allowed  by  the  IRS 
had  declined  to  1.2  percent  of  loans. 
Beginning  in  198 1 bank  failures  began  to  rise  and 
in  1982  net  loan  losses  relative  to  total  loans  began 
a fairly  steady  increase  that  would  last  through  the 
1980s  and  into  the  1990s  (see  chart).  Regulators 
and  accountants  were  no  longer  willing  to  permit 







Table  2 
Tax  Laws and  Rulings Affecting  Banks’  Reserves for Loan  Losses 
Type  of  decree 
Revenue  Act 
Ruling 
Ruling 
Effect  on  reserves 
Allowed  all  businesses  to  make  additions  to  bad  debt  reserves  from  pre-tax  income.  Amount 
set  aside  was  to  be  reasonable  based  on  loss  experience  of  individual  businesses. 
Allowed  banks  to  cumulate  reserves  for  loan  losses  from  pre-tax  income  up  to  three  times  the 
banks’  average  annual  losses  of  the  past  20  years. 
Banks  could  choose  any  20-year  period  after  1927 on  which  to  calculate  their  maximum 
reserves. 
Ruling  All  banks  could  accumulate  reserves  from  pre-tax  income  up  to  2.4  percent  of  total  loans. 
Further  additions  must  come  from  after-tax  income. 
Tax  Reform  Act  Mandated  the  following  phased  reduction  of  maximum  reserves  percentage  above  which 
provisions  could  not  be  made  from  pre-tax  income: 
1969-75  maximum  reserves/loans  =  1.8  percent 
1976-81, 1.2  percent 
1982-87,  0.6 percent. 
Also  specified  eventual  replacement  of  percentage-of-loans  method  with  maximum  reserves 
based  only  on  bank’s  loss  experience.  Between  1969  and  1987  banks  could  choose  either 
the  appropriate  percentage  or the  “experience  method”  in which  the  maximum  reserve  equals 
the  product  of the  average  net  charge-off  to total  loans  ratio  for  the  most  recent  six years  times 
current  outstanding  total  loans.  Banks  could  switch  between  percentage-of-loans  method  and 
experience  method  from  year  to  year  between  1969  and  1987.  After  1987  only  the  experi- 
ence  method  could  be  used. 
Tax  Reform  Act  Banks  with  assets  over  $500  million  must  use  “specific  charge-off  method”  that  permits  no 
additions  to  reserves  for  loan  losses  from  pre-tax  income  beyond  current  year’s 
charge-offs.  For  smaller  banks,  1969  Tax  Reform  Act  holds. 
banks  to  base  the  size  of their  reserves  either  on  a 
standard  rule  or on  a shrinking  arbitrary  percentage 
set  by  the  IRS  (after  1982  banks  were  not  taxed  on 
additions  to reserves  when  the  reserve  was  less than 
.6 percent  of loans).  Regulators  began  to encourage 
banks  to  calculate  reserves  based  on  their  own 
expectations  of  future  losses  in  the  loan  portfolio. 
The  chart  shows  that  in the  early  1980s  banks,  on 
average,  responded  to regulatory  pressure,  or at least 
Percent 
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to growing  loan  losses,  by  maintaining  reserves  well 
above  the  maximum  .6  percent  of  total  loans  per- 
mitted  by the  IRS.  The  chart  also demonstrates  that 
the  gap  between  reserves  and  loan  losses  (both 
expressed  per  dollar  of loans)  shrank  from  the  early 
1970s  to  1987  but  recently  has  returned  to  levels 
common  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  The  earlier  gap 
developed  in response  to tax incentives,  but the  more 
recent  gap  reflects  expected  large  losses  from  loans 
to less developed  countries  and from  commercial  real 
estate  loans. 
While  regulators  have  been  pushing  banks  to base 
reserves  on  expected  loan  losses,  they  have  re- 
cently  de-emphasized  reserves  somewhat  as a com- 
ponent  of regulatory  capital.  Traditionally  reserves 
for  loan  losses  have  been  counted  in  regulators’ 
measures  of capital  (see  “Definitions  of Terms”  on 
p.  29 for the  ratios  regulators  use  currently  in capital 
adequacy  measures).  Before  1988  all  of  a  bank’s 
reserve  for loan  losses  was included  in the  regulators’ 
main  measure  of bank  capital,  primary  capital,  and 
therefore  was  allowed  to  play  an  important  role  in 
adding  to bank  capital adequacy.  Since  1988,  reserves 
for loan  losses  have  been  de-emphasized  somewhat 
in capital  adequacy  measures,  since  they  are counted 
only  in  Tier  2  capital  and  only  up  to  a  specified 
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3-474.1  and  3-474.21.  According  to  the  capital 
guidelines  agreed  upon  by  all three  federal  regulators 
in  1988,  capital  adequacy  is measured  using  Tier  1 
capital  and  total  capital  (the  sum  of  Tier  1  and 
Tier  2 capital).  Total  capital includes  reserves  for loan 
losses,  up  to  a  specified  limit,  and  therefore  is 
augmented  by  additions  to  reserves. 
Determining the Size  of the 
Loan  Loss  Reserve 
Banks  employ  various  techniques  to  set  their 
reserve  for  loan  loss  levels.  The  amount  of reserve 
maintained  is scrutinized  by  bank  regulators  and  is 
often  modified  following  bank  examinations.  Banks 
maintain  reserves  at  a  constant  ratio  to  loans,  to 
past  loan  losses,  or  at  levels  comparable  to  those 
maintained  by  their  peers.  Alternatively  they  set 
reserves  to advance  income  or tax management  goals. 
Finally  they  set  reserve  levels  by  performing  an 
analysis  of potential  loan  losses  in  their  portfolios. 
They  may  even  use  a  blend  of  some  or  all of  the 
preceding. 
Constant  Percentage-of--Loans  Rde  This  technique 
requires  that  the  bank  decide  on  some  target  level 
for  the  ratio  of reserves  to  total  loans  and  then  add 
to the  reserve  account  whenever  the  ratio  falls below 
target.  The  percentage-of-loans  technique  requires 
no determination  of expected  future  loan  losses.  The 
method  was  used  by  the  majority  of  banks  before 
the  mid-1970s  with  the  target  percent  determined 
by  the  IRS  and  by  tax  laws.  For  large  banks,  since 
the  passage  of the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1986,  and  for 
smalI banks,  since  1988  and the  beginning  of the final 
phase  of the  Tax  Reform  Act  of  1969,  there  is no 
tax  incentive  to base  reserves  on  a percent  of loans. 
Some  small  banks,  however,  may  continue  to  use 
the  rule,  setting  the  ratio  of  reserves  to  loans  at  1 
to  2  percent. 
Use of the technique  limits the analysis a bank  must 
perform  to determine  the  size  of its reserve  account 
but  can  lead  to  several  problems.  First,  regulators 
and  a bank’s  outside  accountants  are likely  to object 
to the  technique  at some  point  since  both  the  Finan- 
cial Accounting  Standards  Board  (FASB)  and federal 
regulators  have  stated  plainly  that  the  reserve  is to 
be  based  on  expected  losses  [FASB  (1989),  p.  351. 
Therefore  a bank  may  be required  to show  that  there 
is a relationship  between  its  reserves  and  expected 
loan  losses.  Second,,using  the  technique  may  leave 
the  reserve  for  loan  losses  too  small  to  deal  with 
several  quarters  of substantial  loan  losses.  If instead 
the  bank  were  performing  a  more  sophisticated 
analysis  of expected  loan  losses,  loan  losses  might 
be  better  predicted  and  the  reserve  augmented  in 
preparation. 
Peer Equiwaient  In  its  most  basic  form  the  peer 
equivalent  technique  involves  setting  the  reserve 
for loan  losses  equal  to  or near  the  level  maintained 
by  a  bank’s  peers.  Financial  reports  for  banks  are 
widely  published,  so  determining  the  amount  of 
reserves  held  by  peer  banks  of  equivalent  size 
operating  in equivalent  markets  is a simple  matter. 
The  advantage  of  the  technique  is that,  like  the 
constant  percentage-of-loans  technique,  it allows  the 
bank  to  avoid  any  detailed  and  costly  analysis  of its 
loans.  While  a few  small  banks  may  make  exclusive 
use  of such  a simple  approach,  most  banks  make  use 
of peer  information  as one  of several  elements  in their 
determination  of  appropriate  reserve  level.  Banks 
compare  their  own  reserves  relative  to  loans  to  that 
of peers  to  determine  if their  reserve  is in line  with 
that  of their  peers.  Regulators  also encourage  banks 
to  compare  themselves  with  peers  but  not  to  the 
exclusion  of  analysis  of  expected  losses  [see,  for 
example,  Board  of Governors  (1984),  Section  2 19.1, 
p.  3;  and  OCC  (1984),  Section  217.3,  p.  1). 
Loss History  Most  banks  use  prior  years’  history 
of loan losses  to help them  determine  current  reserves 
for loan losses.  Since  the  amount  of each  small bank’s 
tax  benefits  available  from  provisions  for loan  losses 
is  determined  by  a formula  based  upon  past  years’ 
loan  losses,  some  of these  banks  place  considerable 
weight  on such losses when  deciding  current  reserves. 
For  other  banks,  prior  losses  on fairly homogeneous 
loans  such  as credit  card  loans,  auto  loans,  personal 
loans,  and  home  mortgages  can provide  a reasonable 
guide  to  what  can  be  expected  in  the  future. 
Since  the  regulatory  agencies  warn  their  examiners 
not  to  allow  banks  to  rely  too  heavily  on  historical 
loss  data,  it  is  likely  that  most  banks  do  not  place 
an unwarranted  emphasis  on  past  experience  when 
determining  their  appropriate  reserve  levels  [see, 
for example,  OCC  (1984),  Section  2 17.1,  p.  2; Board 
of  Governors  (1984),  Section  219.1,  p.  2;  and 
AICPA  (1983),  p.  621.  The  problem  with  relying 
completely  on  loss  history  is  that  loan  losses  are 
affected  by  factors  that  change  over  time,  such  as 
the  phase  of  the  business  cycle  and  management 
philosophy  about  the  declaration  of  loan  losses,  so 
that  the  experience  of the  last  several  years  may  not 
always  be  a  good  predictor  of  future  conditions. 
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in  reported  income  through  their  choices  of  when 
to  take  provisions  for  loan  losses.  By  taking  small 
provisions  during  periods  of poor  operating  income 
and  large  provisions  when  income  is  high,  a  bank 
can  shift  reported  income  from  prosperous  to  de- 
pressed  times,  thus  smoothing  its  reported  income 
stream.  Choosing  the  size  of provisions  to  dampen 
reported  income  fluctuations  may,  however,  lead the 
bank’s  auditors,  regulators,  or  the  Securities  and 
Exchange  Commission  (SEC)  to question  the  bank’s 
income  or  expenses  reporting. 
Tax Management  When  additions  to  the  reserve 
for  loan  losses  were  tax  deductible  beyond  actual 
charge-offs  or  loan.  loss  experience,  bank  income 
taxes  were  lowered  in high  income  years  by  taking 
larger  provisions  for loan  losses.  When  income  was 
down,  and  tax  benefits  were  not  as  valuable,  pro- 
visions  were  decreased.  Banks  can still produce  some 
tax  benefits  through  shrewd  use  of  the  reserve  ac- 
count.  Large,  banks,  for  which  tax  deductions  are 
limited  .to  actual  loan  charge-offs,  can  to  some 
extent  concentrate  charge-offs  when  income  is high. 
Small  banks,  which  since  1988  have  been  using  the 
experience  method  of determining  tax-deductibility, 
can set aside the maximum  provisions  allowed by past 
loss  experience  when  income  is high,  and  fairly  low 
provisions  in years  when  income  is low.  As with  in- 
come  management,  these  maneuvers  are  likely  to 
produce  questions  from  the  IRS,  regulators,  and 
auditors. 
Loan  AnaLlyis  Regulators,  in  their  efforts  to 
promote  more  accurate  reporting  of banks’  income 
and  net  worth,  have  been  encouraging  banks  to use 
careful  loan  analysis  in the  determination  of reserve 
levels  since  the  mid-1980s.  When  a  bank  sets  its 
reserves  for loan  losses  equal  to  an estimate-based 
on analysis  of each  loan  or loan category-of  the  loss 
inherent  in  the  loan  portfolio,  it  determines  its 
reserves  using  the  loan  analysis  method.  While 
there  is considerable  variation  among  banks  in  the 
specifics  of  the  analysis,  the  basic  procedures  are 
similar. 
Banks  generally  divide  loans  into  categories  and 
then  apply  differing  analyses  to  each  category  to 
estimate  the  reserves  needed  for  each  category. 
These  estimates  are  summed  across  categories  to 
arrive  at a total  for the  loan  portfolio  (see  Figure  4). 
In general,  loans  are divided  at a minimum  into  large 
classified  loans,  other  large loans,  and  small commer- 
cial  and  consumer  loans. 
Figure  4 
Estimate  of  Needed  Reserves for  Loan  Losses 
Loan  Category 
Estimated 
Prinrikyl  Needed 
Reserve  -  - 
Large  classified  loans 








Other  large  loans  1,250,OOO 
Problem  small  commercial  loans  8,000 
Problem  small  consumer  loans  10,000 
Small  commercial  loans  900,000 
Consumer  loans  1,000,000 
Total  estimated  needed  reserves 










For  most  banks  the  majority  of  large  loans,  i.e., 
those  that  are  significant  in relation  to  bank  capital 
or total  loans,  are found  in the  commercial  loan port- 
folio.  Classified  loans  are  those  that  have  been 
placed  in  higher-than-normal  risk  classes  either  by 
the  bank’s  internal  loan  review  or  by  examiners.  A 
bank’s  entire  portfolio  of  large  loans  is  frequently 
reviewed  to  determine  (1)  which  loans  present 
greater-than-average  risk  and  should  therefore  be 
classified  and  (2)  whether  those  loans  already 
classified  should  be unclassified  or moved  to a higher 
risk  category.  Classified  loans  are  scrutinized  more 
carefully  than  other  loans when  determining  reserves 
for  loan  losses. 
An expected  loss or range  of losses  for all classified 
loans  for each  risk  class may  be estimated  from  past 
years’  losses  and  recoveries  for  that  class  of  loans, 
from  knowledge  of the  individual  classified  loans,  or 
from  a combination  of both.  A reserve  need  is com- 
puted  for  each  loan  or  class  of  loans  as  the  multi- 
plicative  product  of the  chance  of expected  loss  for 
the  loan  or  class  times  the  dollar  amount  of  the 
expected  loss.  Some  of  the  factors  banks  typically 
consider  when  deciding  the  probability  and  amount 
of  loss  from  a  classified  loan  are  the  following: 
whether  the  loan is currently  past  due,  and if so, how 
far past  due;  also,  the  financial  condition  of the  bor- 
rower,  the  availability  of  responsible  cosigners  or 
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national  and  regional  economic  trends,  and,  finally, 
industry  trends.2 
The  losses  inherent  in the  portfolio  of other  large 
loans,  i.e.,  large  loans  that  are  not  classified,  must 
also be estimated  to determine  the  amount  of reserves 
needed  for  these  loans.  The  estimate  is  based  on 
(1)  historical  loss  data  for  large  loans  with  normal 
risk,  classified  by  type  of  loan,  (2)  knowledge  of 
the  creditworthiness  of the  individual  borrowers,  and 
(3)  economic  and  industry  trends. 
Expected  losses  on  small  commercial  loans  and 
consumer  loans  that  are  not  past  due  or  on  nonac- 
crual  status  are  estimated  from  loss  histories  of 
the  various  types  of loans  and  from  other  consider- 
ations  that  may  influence  losses  in  the  future.  For 
example,  a bank  may  have  suffered  losses  ranging 
from  2  to  4  percent  per  year  of  its  credit  card 
portfolio  over  the  past  five  years.  It  would  be 
reasonable,  therefore,  for  the  bank  to  maintain 
reserves  for  credit  card  loans  equal  to  4 percent  of 
the  average  amount  of the  bank’s  outstanding  credit 
* During  1990  the  Financial  Accounting  Standards  Board, 
the  primary  accounting  rule-making  body,  began  considering  a 
proposal  that  could,  if implemented,  result  in a new  accounting 
standard  to  be  used  by  banks  in  their  calculations  of  the 
amount  of reserve  needed  for individual  “impaired  loans”  (loans 
for  which  it  is probable  that  the  bank  will  not  collect  all prin- 
cipal  and  interest  payments  according  to  the  terms  of the  loan 
contract).  Under  the  new  standard  the  amount  of reserve  con- 
sidered  adequate  for an impaired  loan would  equal  the  difference 
between  the  book  value  of  the  loan  and  the  present  value  of 
the  expected  cash  flow  generated  by  the  loan.  The  new  stan- 
dard  would  apply  only  to  impaired  loans. 
card  loans,  assuming  conditions  affecting  losses  on 
such  loans  to  be  unchanged  in the  coming  year.3  If 
rising unemployment  or some  other  factor  that  might 
increase  losses  is expected  in the  coming  year,  the 
amount  of reserves  needed  for these  loans  would  be 
higher.  Small  commercial  loans  and  consumer  loans 
that  are  past  due  or  on  nonaccrual  status  generally 
require  larger  reserves  than  current  loans,  since  a 
borrower’s  failure  to make  scheduled  loan  payments 
is an indication  that  a future  loss  may  be  imminent. 
CONCLUSION 
Most  banks  no  longer  set  their  loan  loss  reserves 
at  some  fixed  percentage  of  total  loans  as  was 
customary  until  the  early  1980s.  Owing  to  (1)  the 
elimination  of most  of the  tax  incentive  to  maintain 
excess  loan  loss reserves,  (2) to regulators’  abandon- 
ment  of  a fixed  target  reserve  to  loans  ratio,  (3)  to 
the  diminished  role  of reserves  in regulatory  capital 
measures,  and  (4) to  regulatory  pressure  to use  loan 
loss  analysis  in reserve  determination,  the  reserve  is 
now  more  likely to measure  potential  loan losses  than 
in  the  past.  Nevertheless,  the  desire  to  smooth 
reported  profits,  to  lower  taxes,  and  to  limit  the 
expenses  of estimating  future  loan  losses  continues 
to  provide  an  incentive  for  banks  to  hold  reserves 
at levels  that  differ  from  their  best  estimates  of the 
losses  inherent  in  their  loan  portfolios. 
3 For  low  value,  high  volume  loans  regulators  require  banks  to 
hold  reserves  only  for the  coming  year’s  expected  losses,  rather 
than  holding  reserves  for expected  losses  over  the  life of the  loan, 
which  may  exceed  one  year. 
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risk  reserve 
Charge-off 
Default 
Experience  method 
Foreclosure 
Loan  loss  reserves 
(LW 
Loan  workout 
Net  loans 
Nonaccrual  loan 
Other  real  estate 
owned 
Past  due  loan 
Percentage  method 
Problem  loan 
Provision  for 
loan  losses 
Recovery 
Restructured  loan 
Tier  1 capital 
Tier  2  capital 
Total  capital 
Write-down 
Definitions  of Terms 
Balance  sheet  item,  separate  from  loan  loss  reserve  (LLR),  that  accounts  for  the 
risk  that  foreign  borrowers  will  not  be  able  to  acquire  sufficient  foreign  exchange 
to  repay  loans. 
Completely  removing  a loan  from  the  balance  sheet  by  subtracting  its  book  value 
from  loans  and  from  LLR.  Also  called  write-off. 
Failure  of  borrower  to  satisfy  provisions  of  loan  agreement. 
Basing  the  amount  of  the  addition  to  LLR  on  historical  loan  loss  experience. 
Legal  proceeding  removing  from  the  debtor  all interest  in mortgaged  property  when 
conditions  of  the  mortgage  have  been  violated. 
Balance  sheet  account.  Deducts  from  total  loans  the  portion  of  loan  principal  not 
expected  to  be  paid  back.  Also  called  allowance  for  loan  losses  or  reserves 
for credit losses. 
Process  following  default  in which  a bank  attempts  to  recover  whatever  loan  funds 
it  can. 
Total  loans  less  LLR  and  allocated  transfer  risk  reserve. 
A  loan  carried  on  the  bank’s  balance  sheet  that  no  longer  accrues  interest.  Any 
payments  received  are  deducted  from  principal  but  not  booked  as  income. 
Balance  sheet  account  showing  the  book  value  of  all real  estate,  other  than  bank 
premises,  owned  by  the  bank.  Consists  largely  of  repossessed  real  estate. 
A  loan  more  than  30  days  behind  in  interest  or  principal  payments. 
Basing  the  amount  of the  addition  to  LLR  on  a percentage  specified  by  regulators 
or  by  tax  policy. 
A  loan  judged  likely  to  produce  a loss.  Characterized  by  some  occurrence  such  as 
late  principal  or  interest  payments.  Includes  any  loan  past  due  or  on  nonaccrual 
status.  Also  called  a troubled loan. 
Income  statement  expense  account  showing  amount  added  to  LLR. 
Funds  received  on  a loan  previously  charged  off. 
A  loan  on  which  the  bank  has  granted  the  borrower  some  concession  because  of 
the  borrower’s  financial  difficulties. 
Stockholders’  equity  +  perpetual  preferred  stock  +  minority  interest  in consolidated 
subsidiaries. 
Limited-life  preferred  stock  +  subordinated  debt  +  reserves  for  loan  losses  up  to 
a specified  maximum  percent  of risk-weighted  assets  (1.5  percent  before  1993  and 
1.25  percent  after  1992). 
Tier  1  capital  +  Tier  2  capital.  Tier  2  capital  cannot  exceed  Tier  1  capital  in 
Total  capital. 
Reducing  the  book  value  of  a loan  by  subtracting  a portion  of that  value  from  the 
loan  and  from  LLR. 
Source for some definitions: Glenn G. Mum,  F. L. Garcia, and Charles J. Woelfel, eds. Encyc(opdiu  ofhnkingandfimncc,  9th ed., Rolling Meadows, 
Ill.: Bankers Publishing Company,  1991. 
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